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1. INTRODUCTION
An exchange economy with differential information, consists of a finite set of agents
each of whom is characterized by a random utility function, an initial endowment, a private
information set and a prior.
The purpose of this paper is to study the following questions: How does one define the
notion of the core in an exchange economy with differential information? What is the
appropriate core concept? Under what conditions on agent's characteristics is the core
nonempty?
It should be noted that with finitely many states of nature, the existence of core alloca-
tions for an economy with differential information, follows easily from the well known result
of Scarf (1967), as first shown in a seminal paper by Wilson (1978). However, with a contin-
uum of states even if there is symmetric information (i.e., the information set of each agent is
the same) the domain of the expected utility becomes infinite dimensional (even if there is
only one good in the economy), and consequently Scarfs theorem is not directly applicable. It
turns out that in the presence of a continuum of states, functional analytic methods as well as
several measure theoretic results seem to be required.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 contains notation and definitions. The
model and the main results are presented in Section 3. Sections 4 and 5 contain the proof of
our main theorems. Finally Section 6 contains some concluding remarks.
2. NOTATION AND DEFINITIONS
2.1. Notation
R' denotes the /-fold Cartesian product of the set of real numbers R
R + denotes the positive cone of R'.
R^_+ denotes the strictly positive elements of R'.
2A denotes the set of all nonempty subsets of the set A
.
denotes the empty set.
/ denotes the set theoretic subtraction.
If X is a linear topological space, its dual is the space X* of all continuous linear func-
tional on X, and if/? e X*, and x e X the value of p at x is denoted by p • x.
2.2. Definitions
If X and Y are sets, the graph of the set-valued function (or correspondence),
4> : X — 2 Y is denoted by G^ = {(.v, y) G X xY: ye <f>(x)}. Let (T, T, /z) be a complete, fin-
ite measure space, and X be a separable Banach space. The set-valued function
<f> : T — 2X
is said to have a measurable graph if G^ 6 T (x) (3{X\ where 0(X) denotes the Borcl a-algebra
on X and ® denotes product a-algebra. The set-valued function <f> : r — 2X is said to be
lower measurable or just measurable if for every open subset V of A', the set
{t e T : <f>(t)n V + 0} is an element of T. A well-known result of Debreu [(1966), p. 359]
says that if
<f> : T —* 2X has a measurable graph, then <^> is lower measurable. Furthermore, if
<f>(
• ) is closed valued and lower measurable then <£ : T — 2X has a measurable graph. A
theorem of Aumann (1967) which will be of fundamental importance in this paper tells us,
that if (7\ T,/i) is a complete, finite measure space, J is a separable metric space and
<f>
: T — 2X is a nonempty valued correspondence having a measurable graph, then
<f>(
•
)
admits a measurable selection, i.e., there exists a measurable function / : T —* X such that
f(t)€<t>(t) ii-a.e.
Let (7\ T,/i) be a finite measure space and A' be a Banach space. Following Dicstcl-
Uhl (1977) the function / : T —* X is called simple if there exist je lt .x 2 , . . . , ,y„ in X and
«!, at3 a, in T such that / = £ x,xa,, where Xa,(^ ) - 1 if / € a,- and xa,(^ ) = if / g a,-.
1=1
A function / : r — ,V is said to be ^-measurable if there exists a sequence of simple
functions /„ : T -* X such that lim \\f n {t) - /(Oil = for almost all t e T. A ^-measurable
n—KX3
function / : T — X is said to be Bochner integrable if there exists a sequence of simple func-
tions [fn :n- 1, 2, ... ) such that
lim / ||/ n(/)-/(OlkMO = 0.
n—oo l
In this case we define for each E e T the integral to be / / (t)d^{t) = lim J f n (t)d^(t).
It can be shown [see Diestcl-Uhl (1977), Theorem 2, p. 45] that, if / : T -* X is a im-
measurable function then / is Bochner integrable if and only if J \\f (t)\\d n(t) < oc. It is
important to note that the Dominated Convergence Tlieorem holds for Bochner integrable func-
tions, in particular, if f n : T — X, {n - 1, 2, . . . ) is a sequence of Bochner integrable func-
tions such that lim J n (t) = f (t) n-a.e. , and \\f n (t )|| < g(t) \i-a.e. , ( where g : T —* R is an
fl —* oo
integrable function), then / is Bochner integrable and lim J \\f n (t)-/(t)\\dfj.(t) = 0.
n — oo *
For 1 < p < oo, we denote by £p (£t, A') the space of equivalence classes of .V-valued
Bochner integrable functions x : T —» X normed by
i_
ll-V||p =(/r ||A-(/)||^M/))
P
.
It is a standard result that normed by the functional || • ||p above, Lp (n, X) becomes a
Banach space [see Dicstel-Uhl (1977), p. 50]. Recall that a correspondence 4> : T — 2X is
said to be integrably bounded if there exists a map h e L^fi, R ) such that
sup {||.v || : x €<Kt))<h(t)r-a.e.
A Banach space 4V has the Radon -Nikodym Property with respect to the measure space
(7\ T, /i) if for each /i-continuous measure G : T — X of bounded variation there exists
g e Li(/i, X) such that G(E) = / g(t)dn(t) for all E e T. A Banach space X has the Radon-
Nikodym property (RNP) if X has the RNP with respect to every finite measure space. Recall
now [sec Diestel-Uhl (1977, Theorem 1, p. 98)] that if (7*,T,/x) is a finite measure space
\<p < oo, and X is a Banach space, then X' has the RNP if and only if
(LP (M , X)Y = L>, Af*) where -*-+-*-= 1.
p q
We will close this section by collecting some basic results on Banach lattices [for an
excelent treatment see Aliprantis-Burkinshaw (1985)]. Recall that a Banach lattice is a Banach
space L equipped with an order relation > (i.e. , > is a reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive
relation) satisfying:
(i) x > y implies x + z > y + z for every z in L ,
(ii) x > y implies Ajc > \y for all A > 0,
(iii) for all x,y in L there exists a supremum (least upper bound) x My and an
infimum (greatest lower bound) x A y,
(iv) \x | > \y\ implies ||x|| > ||y|| for all x, y in L.
As usual x + = x M 0, x~ = (-x ) V and \x \ = x V (-x ) = x + + ,x~ ; we call x +, x~ the
positive and negative parts of x, respectively and \x \ the absolute value of x. The symbol |j • ||
denotes the norm on L. If x, y are elements of the Banach lattice L, then we define the order
interval [x, y] as follows:
[x,y] = {z e L : x < z < y }.
Note that [x, y] is norm closed and convex (hence weakly closed). A Banach lattice L is said
to have an order continuous norm if, x a ^0 in L implies ||xj|0. A very useful result which is
going to play an important role in the sequel is that if L is a Banach lattice then the fact that
L has order continuous norm is equivalent to the weak compactness of the order interval
[x , z] = (y e L : x < y < z) for every x, z in L, [sec for instance Aliprantis-Brown-
Burkinshaw (1989), Theorem 2.3.8, p. 104 or Lindenstrauss-Tzafriri (1979, p. 28)].
We finally note that Cartwright (1974) has shown that if A' is a Banach lattice with order
continuous norm (or equivalenty .V has weakly compact order intervals) then Z-^/i, X), has
weakly compact order intervals, as well. Cartwright's theorem will play a crucial role in the
proof of our main results.
3. MODEL AND RESULTS
3.1 The Core of an Exchange Economy with Differential Information
Let Y be a separable Banach lattice with order continuous norm, whose dual Y* has the
RNP. 1 Let (fL F, /z) be a complete cr-finite measure space.
An exchange economy with differential information T = {(A',, u,-, e,-, Fit q{ ) : /'=1,2,..., n)
is a set of quintuples (X{ , u { , eit F,, q { ) where,
y
(1) X{ : Q — 2 + is the random consumption set of agent /,
(2) iii : fi x Xx — R is the random utility function of agent /',
(3) F, is a (measurable) partition2 of (fi,F) denoting the'private information of agent i,
(4) e,| : — F+ is the random initial endowment of agent /, e,( " ) is F, -measurable,
Bochner integrable and e,(a>) G A'.Cu;) for all /, p-a.e.,
(5) <?, : fi — R++ is the prior of agent /', (i.e., q{ is a Radon-Nikodym derivative hav-
ing the property that / Qi(t)d n(t) =1).
ten
Denote by Lx . the set of all Bochner integrable and F\-measurable selections from the con-
sumption set Xi of agent / , i.e.,
Lx = ixi e L x (y., Y+) ' x i : fl — K+ is F, -measurable
and Xi(ta)sXi(u) n-a.e.}.
For each /, (/' = 1,2, .
.
.,«), denote by F,(a;) the event in F, containing the realized state of
nature w€fl and suppose that f qi (t)dn(t) > for all /. Given F,(u;) in F, define the
conditional expected utility of agent i , F, : Q x Lx — R by
A basic example of a space which satisfies all these conditions is the Euclidean space It . Remark 6.1
Section 6 presents some more examples.
One could have assumed that F, is a sub (7— algebra of F.
(3.1) VM x { ) = J[ «,-(/, *,(/))<?,(/ | £»)^(0
where
(3.2) 9i (/ | £,-(«)) =
fc(0
if * £ £t-(w)
if / € Ei(w)
iU)^'^(')
We are now ready to define the central notions of the paper.
Definition 3.1.1: We say that x = (x u x 2 , . . . , xn ) e n Lx . is a core allocation for T, if
t=i •
(0 £*• = E*.> and
1=1 1=1
(ii) It is not true that there exist S c (1, 2, . .
.
, n) and (v,), es e IT Lx . such that
Z)-V i = Yj ei anc* K(w > y*) > Pi(w » *<) f°r a^ ' e 5" for /i-almost all u> e f2 (where
tes ies
Vi is given by (3.1)).
A couple of comments are in order: Note that x e U Lx . implies that each jc,-( • ) is F,
t=i •
measurable and therefore the vector x(u) = (x^w), x 2(u), . . . , xn (<x>)) e U X^oj) is VF,
t' = l i=i
measurable, (where \l F{ denotes the join, the smallest partition containing F u F 2 , . . . , Fn ).
i-l
Condition (i) above implies thar the markets are cleared in each state of nature, i.e.,
£) .v,(a;) = ]T}e,(ci;) n - a.e.. Condition (ii) shows that no coalition of agents (while each agent
i=i i=i
in the coalition uses his/her own private information) can redistribute their initial endow-
ments among themselves for any state of nature and make the conditional expected utility of
each agent in the coalition better off.
Note that condition (ii) of definition 3.1.1. implies the following condition:
(ii)' It is not true that there exist S c {1,2, ..., n) and y : Q -* II Xit yt ( • ) is
i€S
A F, -measurable (where A F, denotes the meet, i.e., the maximal partition con-
ies i€S
tained in all of them) such that J] j>»(w) =- J] ei((J°) p-a.e. and
%es ies
Vi(u, }\) > Pi(w» *») for a11 » € 5" for /i-almost all u € n.
The above blocking notion is the one adopted by Wilson (1978) to define his coarse core con-
cept.3 Note that since each yA • ) is A F, -measurable, the information is verifiable by each
ies
member of the coalition. For instance, if we imagine that agents negotiate the terms of a con-
tract, then Wilson's definition tells us that a coarse core allocation has the property that no
coalition of agents can exchange their own information (in fact, information is verifiable by
each member of the coalition) and make each agent in the coalition better off. In other words
contracts are realizable because information is verifiable. However, according to our condi-
tion (ii) of definition 3.1.1., information is not necessarily verifiable by all the members of the
coalition (it is only privately verifiable). The latter makes the core smaller, i.e., any core allo-
cation satisfying the definition 3.1.1. is a coarse core allocation (recall that if
v,( • ) is A F, -measurable, it is also F, -measurable, of course the reverse is not true). Hence,
ies
the theorems that we will prove on the existence of core allocations will imply the existence of
coarse core allocations as well.
Note that if we were to narrow the set of core allocations by replacing F,-measurability
of v,( • ) in (ii) of definition 3.1.1, with the V F,-measurability of y : fl — II Xit then it is easy
to construct examples which satisfy all the assumptions of Theorem 3.1 below, but the core is
empty [see Wilson (1978) for examples to that effect]. We are not aware of any natural set of
assumptions on utility functions and initial endowments which will guarantee the existence of
such a core. Finally, it is worth pointing out that a core notion which allows for complete
See also Kobayashi (1980) who has also used the coarse core.
8exchange of information among agents in each coalition may not be an appropriate concept,
since in most applications, agents do not have an incentive to reveal their own private infor-
mation (think of situations of moral hazard or adverse selection).
n
Definition 3.1.2: We say that x € Tl Lx . is (interim) Pareto optimal if.A
(0 £.x, = £e,, and
«'=i «=i
(ii) It is not true that there exists y € U L^. such that £;>, = Yi e i an^
1=1 i=l i=l
V%{u, j\) > Vi(u, xt ) for all i for /i-almost all w e ft (where V{ is given by (3.1)).
Definition 3.1.3: We say that x 6 II Lx is individually rational if:
«=i
(i) Ex.— E^.and
i=i t=i
(ii) Vi(u, x,) > F,(u>, e
t ) for all i and for /x-almost all u e CI, (where V{ is given by
(3.1)).
Finally, if the private information set of each agent, is the same (symmetric information, i.e.,
n
Fi = F for all /) we call any x e II Lx . satisfying (i) and (ii) of Definition 3.1.1, symmetric
»=i * * «
core allocation for V.
We are now ready to state our first main result:
Theorem 3.1: Let T = {(.V,, uit e t , F,, qt ) : / = 1, 2, . . . , n) be an exchange economy
with differential information satisfying the following assumptions, for each
A similar notion is defined by Palfrey and Srivastava (1987).
/, (/ = 1,2, ...,«),
(a.3.1) X
x
: ft —» 2
Y+
is an integrably bounded, convex, closed, nonempty valued and
Fj -measurable correspondence,
(a.3.2) for each u> e Q, «f-(w, • ) is weakly continuous and integrably bounded, and
(a.3.3) for each u e Q, «,(o;, • ) is quasi-concave.
Then a core allocation exists in r.
The following Corollaries follow directly from Theorem 3.1.
Corollary 3.1: Let T = {(A',, «,-, e { , Ft-, qt ) : i = 1, 2, . . . , n) be an exchange economy
with differential information satisfying all the assumptions of Theorem 3.1. Then an individu-
ally rational and Pareto optimal allocation exists in T.
Corollary 3.2: Let V = {(A',, «,-, ef , Fit qt ) : i = 1, 2, . . . , n) be an exchange economy
with symmetric information, (i.e., F, = F for all i) satisfying all the assumptions of Theorem
3.1. Then a symmetric core allocation exists in T.
3.2. The a-Core of a Game in Normal Form with Differential Information
A game in normal form with differential information B = ((A",-, n,, F,-, q { ) : i = 1,2,...,/?}
is a set of quadruples (A',, «f-, F,-, <?,) where
(1) X,
;
: n —•• 2 y is the strategy set-valued function of player /,
n
(2) Ui : n x II Xt —» R is the random payoff function of player /,
(3) Fj is a (measurable) partition of (fi, F) denoting the private information of player /',
and
10
(4) q,; : Q —> R++ is the prior of player z, (i.e., q{ is a Radon-Nikodym derivative hav-
ing the property that ft&i <?,(/)<z>(0
= 1).
For each /, (/' = 1, 2, . .
.
, n) denote by £",(0;) the event in F, containing the true state of
nature u eCl and suppose that JteE . (u)Qi(t)dn(t) > 0. Given £t-(w ) m Ft define the conditional
n
expected payoff of player /, Vi : (lx IT Lx . —> R by
1=1 *
(3.3) VM x) = }teE .H Ui(t,x(f))qt {t \Et (u))dft(t\
where #,(/ |£t (w)) is defined as in (3.2).
Before we define the notion of an a-core strategy for the game B we need to introduce some
notation. Denote by / the set of players {1, 2, . .
.
, n). If S c / then (v 5
,
,x
7 /5 ) denotes the
n.
vector z in n Lx . where z,- = r, if / e S and z t- = a:, if / £ S.
Definition 3.2.1: We say that x 6 II Lx . = ZLX is an a-core strategy for B if:
1=1
(i) It is not true that there exist Sol and {yi)ies e II Lx . such that for any
i€5
z
; /5 en Lx . , K,-(w, (v
5
,
z
7 /5 )) > K(w, ,x) for all i e 5 for /i-almost all weQ
(where F, is given by (3.3)).
Note that as previously x e II Lx . implies that each jc,-( • ) is F, -measurable and consc-
«=i •
qucntly the vector x(u) = (.v 1 (a;), . . . , x n (u)) is V F, -measurable. Condition (i) in Definition
3.2.1 indicates that no coalition of players is able to change its strategy (while each player in
the coalition uses his/her own private information) and make the expected utility of each
member in the coalition better off, no matter what the complementary coalition chooses to do
11
(each member in the complementary coalition is also allowed to take advantage of his/her own
private information). Following the previous definition of a coarse core allocation for an
economy with differential information, we can define an a-coarse strategy for the game B,
and show that the set of a-coarse core strategies contains the set of a-core strategies for the
game B.
Since there is no exchange of information among players in each coalition one may sug-
gest that it is possible to analyze games in normal form with differential information (or
economies with differential information) in a noncooperative setting adopting the notion of a
Bayesian Nash equilibrium or correlated equilibrium. However, the latter concepts do not
yield Pareto optimal outcomes, contrary to the core or a-core. It seems to us that selecting
outcomes out of the Pareto frontier is an attractive property for an allocation mechanism to
have. The latter makes the core concept appealing in an economy with differential informa-
tion.
We can now state our second main result.
Theorem 3.2: Let B = {(X
t ,
u ( , F,, q{ ) : i = 1,2,. . . , n) be a game in normal form with
differential information satisfying the following assumptions for each player
/, (/ = I, 2, ...,«),
y
(a.3.2.1) X{ : ft — 2 + is an integrably bounded, nonempty convex weakly compact
valued and F, -measurable correspondence,5
(a. 3.2.2) for each u e ft, u
t
(uj, ) is weakly continuous and integrably bounded, and
(a.3.2.3) for each u e ft, w,-(w, • ) is quasi concave.
The assumption that X
,
( • ) takes values in the positive cone of Y , is not needed for the proof of this
theorem.
12
Then an a-core strategy exists in B .
4. PROOF OF THEOREM 3.1
We first state the well-known core existence result of Scarf (1967) [see also Border
(1984) or Yannelis (1985) for recent generalizations] which is going to play a crucial role in
the proof of Theorem 3.1. We will first need some notation.
Let E = {(X{ , «,-, e { ) : / = 1, 2, . . . ,n) be an exchange economy, where
(1) Xt cR' is the consumption set of agent /,
(2) u { : X,; —» R is the utility function of agent /, and
(3) e { € X{ is the initial endowment of agent i
Define the set-valued function P, : X
t
— 2 • by P,-(jc,-) = {>>,• 6 X, : /<,(>',) > h, (.*,•)}• Scarfs
result asserts that if .V, is a nonempty, closed, convex and bounded from below subset of R',
//, is quasi concave and continuous, (i.e., if P, is convex valued and has an open graph in
n
X{ x X{ ), then core allocations exist in E, i.e., there exists x € Tl X{ such that:
n n
(0 Y,*i - E^.-. and
1=1 1=1
(ii) it is not true that there exist 5cfl,2,...,n) and (yA-es € II X{ such that
ies
T,y'i = E e i and >'i e p*(xi) for a11 » e 's'-
We begin the proof of Theorem 3.1 by constructing a new economy
G = {(L
Yt ,
Pit ei): i = 1,2,...,//} where,
(i) Lx is the consumption set of agent /,
(ii) Pt : Lx . — 2 * is the preference correspondence of agent / defined by
13
Pi(x{ ) = {y, € Lx . : Vffa y.) > Fi(w, x.) for /x-almost all u> e Q), and
(iii) e, e Lx . for all i , is the m/7/7z/ endowment of agent i
.
Note that the existence of a core allocation for G implies the existence of a core allocation for
the original economy T = {(Xi, //,• , eiy F,-, q{ ) : i = 1, 2, . . . , «}. Hence, all we need to show
is that a core allocation exists in the economy G. To this end we first show that for each
Lx .
i
,
Lx . is closed, bounded convex, nonempty and that P, : Lx . — 2 * is convex valued having
a weakly open graph (i.e., the set GP . = {(x,y) € Lx . x Lx . : y e P,(x)} is weakly open in
^x, x Lx .).
Note that the fact that Lx . is convex, closed and bounded follows directly from assump-
tion (a.3.1). To prove that Lx . is nonempty, recall that X,; : f2 — 2 + is F, -measurable,
nonempty, closed valued and therefore Gx . € F, ® 0(Y+). By the Aumann (1967) measurable
selection theorem, we can obtain an F, -measurable function /, : ft —> 7+ such that
fi(u)e Xiiu) ii-a.e. Since .V, is integrably bounded, we can conclude that /,• e L t (p,, Y+).
Hence, /, 6 F^ an<3" this proves that Lx is nonempty.
In order to show that for each /, F, has a weakly open graph, we will first need the fol-
lowing claim:6
Claim 4.1 For each /, (/' = 1,2,...) and for each u> e fi, Vi(u>, • ) is weakly continuous.
Proof: Fix /, (/' = I, 2, . .
.
,«) and u 6 n and let F,M be an event in Ft . Consider the
sequence {x
t
m
: m = 1, 2, . . . } in Ly.'cLjOx, K), which converges weakly to x,-e Lx ., i.e.,
p .v,
m converges to p x t for any p e LJiji, Y*) - (L x (/x, K))* (recall that F* has the RNP).
Note that x/" converges weakly to .v, is equivalent to the fact that p • x-nxA = pxa ' xf* con-
verges to p x {\a = PXa ' x i f° r anv P £ £oo(m> Y*), A e F and each condition above implies
that y
' xj*xA = y
'
Xa ' *F converges toy' x { xa = >' 'xa ' x i f° r anv y' € Y' , A e F . If we
A similar result is proved in Yannelis-Rustichini (1988).
14
show that x^xe.^) converges pointwise in the weak topology of Xt to xt-x&(w)i then since for
each w € H, iii(u), • ) is weakly continuous and integrably bounded the weak continuity of
F,(u>, • ) will follow from the Lebesgue dominated convergence theorem. Now if
F, = [Ei1 , £,2 , . . .} is the partition of agent i , then the fact that x™ and x,- are elements of Lx .
oo oo
implies that x™ = £} x^x«* » *i £ *i,*Xe* . for *.\* . *<,* in *i and consequently we can
k=l k=l
conclude that *rXj%(w) = E*.\*X|tf ni%(w) converges weakly to x,xE .M = E**.*X^h^-(«)- This
A:=l Jk=l
completes the proof of the claim.
In view of Claim 4.1 we can now conclude that for each /', P{ has a weakly open graph.
Moreover, since for each u e Q, w,(w, • ) is quasi-concave so is K,(u>, • ) and therefore, P{ is
convex valued. We will now construct a suitable family of truncated subeconomies in a finite
dimensional commodity space, each of which satisfies the assumptions of Scarfs theorem.
Applying Scarfs theorem, we will obtain a net of core allocations for each subeconomy. By
taking limits we will show that the existence of a core allocation for each subeconomy implies
the existence of a core allocation for the original economy G.
Let A be the set of all finite dimensional subspaces of Z^Oz, Y+) containing the initial
endowments. For each a e A define the consumption set of agent /, Lx
a
by Lx
a
= Lx . n a
and the preference correspondence of agent /, P,
a
: Lx
a
— 2 'by P{
a
(x i ) = Pi(xt ) n Lx
a
.
We now have an economy C ° = {(Lx
°
,
P,
a
, e.) : i = 1, 2, . .
.
, //} in finite dimensional com-
modity space, where,
(4.1) Lx . is the consumption set of agent /',
a
a a "X-
(4.2) P
t
: Lx — 2 ' is the preference correspondence of agent /', and
(4.3) f, € Lx° is the initial endowment of agent /.
15
It can be easily checked that each economy G " satisfies all the ssumptions of Scarfs theorem
n
and therefore there exists xa = (xf , . .
.
, x n
a
) G II Lx = Lx such that
:
1=1
(4.4) y>,«=5>,-,and
i=i i=i
(4.5) it is not true that there exist S C {1, 2, . . . ,n) and (>',),-e5 G II Lx>
a
such that
»€S
E >\- = E^i and v « e pi W) for a11 ' € 5-
i€S i€S
From (4.4) it follows that for each a G A
0< E*f -Ee, -e.
i=i «=i
Hence for each a G A the vectors x,a lie in the order interval
n
[0, e] = {z G II Lx . : < z < e }. Since by assumption order intervals in Y are wcaklv com-
i=i •
n
pact, by Cartwright's theorem the order interval [0, e] in II Lx . is weakly compact. Direct
i=i »
the set A bv inclusion so that {(.xf , x£, , -x na ) : a G A} forms a net in II Lx .. Since all
i=i *
the vectors x" lie in the order interval [0, e] which is weakly compact, the net
{(.x i , . . . , ,xn
a
) : a G A } has a subnet which converges weakly to some vector
xu x2* ... , -xn in [0, e\ We will show that the vector jc ls . . . , x n is a core allocation for the
economy G Denote the convergent subnet by {(x^ m) , . .
.
, ,xn
a(m)
) '• m G A/} where M is a set
n n
directed by ">". Since for all m G M, X).x,a(m) = £e, and *i"(m) converges weakly to
i=i i=i
n n
.x, G Lv., we conclude that £.x, = £<?,- We will now complete the proof by showing that:
i=l i=l
(4.6) It is not true that there exist Sc{1,2,...,b) and 0\), e5 G II Lx . such that
E.v, = £?,- and y% e *>.(*,) for all i G 5.
i'65 i£S
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Suppose that (4.6) is false, then there exist S c (1,2, ... , n) and (yA-es € IT Lx . such that
ies '
E-v« = S et and v,- € Pi(x) for all / € S. Since ,x,a(m) converges weakly to x, and P, has a
ies ies
weakly open graph, there exists m e M such that v t- e P, ix-*^) for all w > m and for all
i e S. Choose m 1 > m so that , if m > m x , y% 6 L^
01 m
for all i e 5". Then
v, e Pi
a(m)
U,a(m) ), for all m >m 1 and for all i e 5. But this contradicts (4.5). Hence (4.6)
holds and this completes the proof of the theorem.
5. PROOF OF THEOREM 3.2
We begin by stating the a-core existence result of Scarf (1971) which is going to be used
in the proof of Theorem 3.2.
Let N = {(Xt , Uf): i = 1, 2, . . . , n) be a game in normal form where,
(1) A', is a compact, convex and nonempty subset of R', denoting the strategy set of
player /', and
n n
(2) «,- : II X, —» R is a quasi-concave function on IT X{ denoting the payoff of
i=i i=i
player /.
n
The strategy vector x e IT X{ is said to be an a-core strategy for N if:
t=i
It is not true that there exist S c {1,2,...,;/} and (v.),es G II X{ such that for any
ies
z^s e n X
t ,
h,(v 5 , z 1 '8 ) > iii(x) for all i e S.
As in the proof of Theorem 3.1 we will construct a new game B
= {{LXi , I',) : i = 1,2,...,//} where,
(a) Lx . is the strategy set of player i , and
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(b) I7',- : H x n Lx . — R is the payoff function of player / , ( defined as in (3.3))
t=i
It is easy to see that the existence of an a-core strategy for B implies the existence of an
a-core strategy for the original game B = {(X,-, uf-, F,-, q{ ) : i = 1, 2, . . . , «}. Our goal is to
construct a suitable family of truncated subgames in a finite dimensional strategy space, each
of which satisfies all the conditions of the Scarf (1971) theorem. Therefore we will obtain a
net of a-core strategies for each subgame. As in the proof of Theorem 3.1, operating a limit-
ing argument we can show that the existence of an a-core strategy for each subgame implies
the existence of an a-core strategy for the orginal game B. Before we start the outlined con-
struction of the family of truncated subgames, we need to make some observations.
Note that for each u> e CI, V{ (u, ) is weakly continuous (recall Claim 4.1) and by virtue of
assumption (a.3.2.3) quasi-concave on n Lx .. Moreover, note that each Lx . is convex and
t=i '
nonempty. However, since Scarfs theorem requires the compactness of each strategy set we
will need to prove the following claim which is known as Diestel's theorem.
Claim 5.1: The set Lx is weakly compact in L^n, Y).
Proof: The proof is based on the celebrated theorem of James (1964) and it is patterned
after that of Khan (1982). Note that the dual of L x(ji, Y) is LJjm, Y**) (where w* denotes the
w*
-topology), i.e., (L
x
(/i, Y))' = LJjjl, Y*»\ [see, for instance, Tulcea-Tulcea (1969)]. Let x
be an arbitrary element af L^/i, Y^*). If we show that x attains its supremum on Lx . the
result will follow from James' theorem, [James (1964)]. Let,
Sup V • x = Sup / (if>i(w) x (w))d /i(u>).
Note that by theorem 2.2 in Hiai-Umegaki (1977),
Sup / (V\(uO • x(u))dti(u) = f Sup (4>i x(w))dn(u>).
For each /, define the set-valued function gi: Q -» 2 Y by
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g{ (u) - {y 6 Xtiu) : v • x = Sup fa x). It follows from the weak compactness of X{ that
<£,-ex,-(w)
for all wen, £,•(&;) is nonempty. For each /, define /,• : Q x Y —> [-00, 00] by
/•(<*>, y) = v • .x - Sup 4> • x. It is easy to see that for each fixed u e Q, /.(o;, • ) is continu-
<*>,ex,(w)
ous and for each fixed y e Y, /,(-,j) is F, -measurable and hence /(•,•) is jointly
F
t
-
-measurable, i.e., for every closed subset V of
[-00, 00], ffl{V) = {(oj,z)e fix Y : z € A;(w)} belongs to F, <g> B(Y). Since ^ is
F, -measurable the set Gx . = {(u,x) : .X € A', (a;)} is an element of Ft ® B(Y). Moreover,
note that G
g
.
= /r*(0) n Gx . and since /,
_1
(0) and Gx . belong to F, <g> B(Y ) so does Gg .. It fol-
lows from the Aumann measurable selection theorem that there exists an F,- -measurable func-
tion z,: fi —» 7 such that z,-(w) G ^-(w) n-a.e. Thus, z { e Lx . and
Sup <£,• x = f {zAu) • x(u))d^(uj) = z, • x. Since jc 6 L^/z, yj«) was arbitrarily chosen,
we conclude that every element of (Li(/i, y))* attains its supremum on Lx ., and this completes
the proof of the fact that Lx . is weakly compact.
We are now ready to construct a suitable family of truncated subgames. To this end let
A be a family of all finite subsets of Lx .. For each A e A let Lx . denote the closed convex
hull of A. Then each Lx . is a compact, convex, nonempty subset of a finite dimensional
Euclidean space and u Lx . = Lx .. Moreover, the set {Lx . : A e A) is directed upwards by
A£A * ' *
inclusion. For each A e A we have a game B = {(Lx . , V{ ) : / = 1, 2, . . . , n) where,
(5.1) Lx is the strategy set of player i, and
a
n
A
(5.2) F, : n x II Lx — R is the payoff function of player /.
t=i *
Each B satisfies the assumptions of Scarfs a-core existence theorem and therefore there
exists x e II Lx satisfying the following property:
t = l
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For //-almost all wGfi, it is not true that there exist S c {1, 2, . .
.
, n) and
(v,)l€5 e n LX
X
such that for each z 1 '8 e n LX
X
,
V{
x
(«. (v
s
,
-
//s
)) > Vt \wt x
A
) for all
i ES.
Since the set A is directed by inclusion we have constructed a net
AAA n
U*i » *2 , . . . , xn ) : A 6 A} of a-core strategies in IT Ly.. Since by Claim 5.1 each Lx . is
AAA
weaklv compact so is n Lx .. Hence the net {(x i , x 2 , . . , xn ) : A € A} has a subset which
i=i
converges weaklv to (x u x 2 , , x n ) in II Lx .. We must show that xu jc2, . . . , xn is an
i=i *
a-core strategy for B. Adopting a similar argument with that used in the proof of Theorem
3.1, one can now complete the proof of Theorem 3.2.
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Remark 6.1: In Theorems 3.1 and 3.2, Y is assumed to be a separable Banach lattice
with order continuous norm whose dual Y* has the RNP. Basic examples of spaces which
satisfy the above properties are:
(i) the Euclidean space R',
(ii) the space l p (1 <p < oo) of real sequences [aK : n = 1, 2, . . . } for which the
1
norm K||p =(£ Kl p ) p is finite,
n= l
(iii) the space L P (Q, F,/z) (1 <p < oo) of measurable functions / on the measure
i_
space (fi,F,/z) for which the norm |[/|L = (/ \f (u)\ p dn(u)) p is finite.
It is important to give examples of spaces that Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 do not cover:
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(iv) L
x [0, 1] or Lx(/i), if /z is not purely atomic, c , /«> • £«> [0> 1] and
(v) the space C(X) of continuous real-valued functions on the infinite compact Haus-
dorff space X (with the supremum norm).
Recall that the spaces in (iv) and (v) do not have the RNP moreover, order intervals are not
weakly compact in L^ [0, 1] and C(X).
Remark 6.2: The separability assumption on Y was used in order to make the Aumann
measurable selection theorem applicable. The latter result was used in several steps in the
proofs of Theorems 3.1 and 3.2. The relaxation of the separability of Y is possible. In this
case however, the consumption set Lx . will be the set of all Gel'fand integrable selections from
the set-valued function X,
:
: Q — 2 1", and one will need to appeal to results on the existence of
weak* measurable selections.
Remark 6.3: Theorem 3.1 and its Corollaries can be easily extended to coalition pro-
duction economies provided that the production technology is assumed to be balanced. The
proof remains essentially unchanged.
Remark 6.4: Kahn and Mookerjee (1989), have introduced a core-like concept in order
to analyse games in normal form with differential information. Their concept in a two-person
game, coincides with the coalitional Nash equilibrium. No existence results are given in their
paper. However, it is known [see, for instance, Scarf (1971)] that even if preferences are
strictly convex and continuous the jet of coalitional Nash equilibrium strategics may be
empty.
Remark 6.5: We conjecture that the core of a large finite private information economy
will converge to the standard Debreu-Scarf (1963) core notion, with the approximation getting
finer the larger the private information economy, (this will follow from the law of large
numbers provided there is some kind of independence among agents). Hence, we can con-
clude that core allocations in large private information economy will become Walrasian. We
also conjecture that without the independence assumption among agents, core allocations in a
21
large private information economy will characterize some kind of rational expectations equili-
brium. 7
Kobayashi (1980, p. 1647) has made a related conjecture for the syndicate problem. Moreover, Srivastava
(1984) has shown that a Wilson-type core allocation in a differential information economy becomes a full information
core allocation as the number of agents in the economy tends to infinity.
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